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Statutory Entitlement and the
Concept of Property
In a series of recent cases, the Supreme Court has decided that
governmental benefits to which recipients have a "statutory entitle-
ment" are a form of property and, therefore, that such benefits may
not be discontinued without due process of law. In particular, the
Court has decided that welfare payments,' old age benefits, 2 social
security disability benefits,3 tenured public employment,4 unemploy-
ment compensation,5 and public education" may not be discontinued
without notice and a hearing.
The Supreme Court has not defined "statutory entitlement," how-
ever, nor has it fully explained why "property," as that term is used
in the due process clause, should be interpreted to include statutory
entitlements. Part I of this Note will propose a tentative definition of
''statutory entitlement," as that concept has thus far evolved in the
Supreme Court. The balance of the Note will consider two explana-
tions of the Supreme Court's interpretation of "property" that can be
gleaned from the opinions of the Justices. The first of these is that
property includes things to which a person has a right and that a
statutory entitlement creates a right to a governmental benefit. The
second explanation is that property includes things on which people
rely and that people rely on governmental benefits to which they have
a statutory entitlement.
Part II of the Note will argue that a statutory entitlement does not
create a right to a governmental benefit and, therefore, that the
1. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
2. Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970).
3. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,
401-02 (1971).
4. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976) (concluding that statute did not create
entitlement); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 166 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part);
id. at 185-86 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 209-11
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972) (dictum); Board
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972) (dictum).
5. Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 389-90 (1975) (remanding for consideration under
due process clause of procedures adopted during pendency of appeal).
6. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-74 (1975); id. at 586 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Supreme Court's decisions on statutory entitlement must presuppose
some other concept of property. Part III will argue that the reliance
concept of property, while adequate to support the conclusion that
statutory entitlement is a form of property, is nevertheless open to
three objections: it rests on a misinterpretation of the purpose of the
institution of property; it is inconsistent with the approach taken by
the Supreme Court in virtually all of its cases on statutory entitlement;
and it would require a radical expansion of the ambit of the due
process clause. The Note therefore concludes that the Supreme Court
has yet to find a concept of property that both encompasses statutory
entitlement and avoids the great expansion of the due process clause
that the Supreme Court decided to forestall in Board of Regents v.
Roth.7
I. Statutory Entitlement as a Form of Property:
The Supreme Court's Approach
A. A Definition of "Statutory Entitlement"
The concept of statutory entitlqment appeared in Goldberg v.
Kelly." But neither Goldberg nor any of its progeny defines "statutory
entitlement" explicitly, nor do they preclude the expansion of that
concept to include various relations between statute, benefit, and
recipient not yet considered by the Supreme Court.9 From these cases,
however, one can infer a tentative definition of statutory entitlement:
a statute will create an entitlement to a governmental benefit either if
the statute sets out conditions under which the benefit must be
granted or if the statute sets out the only conditions under which the
benefit may be denied.' 0
The Supreme Court considered the first type of statutory entitle-
ment in Goldberg v. Kelly. The Court concluded that welfare recipi-
ents had a statutory entitlement to their benefits because the governing
statutes set out standards of eligibility, which the recipients claimed to
meet." The second type of statutory entitlement-in which the statute
7. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
8. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
9. Indced, various lower courts haic expandcd thc conccpt of statutory cntitlcmcnt
well beyond thc Supreme Court's use of the term. See notes 69 & 81 infIra.
10. In his majority opinion in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573 (1975), Justice White
scemed to suggest that the conditions establishing an entitlement could be sct out by
regulation, as well as by statute.
11. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), Justice Stewart explained the
application of the statutory entitlement theory in Goldberg:
[T]he welfare recipients in Goldberg v. Kelly . . . had a claim of entitlement to
welfare payments that was grounded in the statute defining eligibility for themn.
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sets out the only conditions under which the benefit may be denied-
appeared in Arnett v. Kennedy.1 2 The statute in that case provided
that a federal civil servant " 'may be removed or suspended without pay
only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service.' "13
Although the Justices differed over the process that was due, they all
concluded that, since the statute set out exclusive conditions under
which the employee could be removed or suspended, he had a statu-
tory entitlement to employment absent the stated conditions1
If the statute does not set out exclusive conditions under which the
benefit may be denied, it will not create an entitlement. In Bishop v.
Wood, 15 for example, a policeman had been dismissed under the
following ordinance: " 'If a permanent employee fails to perform
work up to the standard of the classification held, or continues to be
negligent, inefficient, or unfit to perform his duties, he may be dis-
missed by the City Manager.' ""; The Supreme Court accepted the
conclusion of the district judge that, as a matter of state law,-T the
ordinance did not confer tenure on municipal employees, apparently
because it did not provide that they could be dismissed if and only if
their work was unsatisfactory.s As thus interpreted, the ordinance did
The recipients had not yet shown that they were, in fact, within the statutory
terms of eligibility. But we held that they had a right to a hearing at which they
might attempt to do so.
Id. at 577 (emphasis added).
12. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
13. Id. at 140 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7501(a) (1970)) (emphasis added).
14. Id. at 151-55 (Rehuquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., & Stewart, J.) (arguing, how-
ever, that substantive entitlement was conditioned by statutory procedures, so that due
process clause would require no procedures beyond those provided by statute); id. at
166 (Powell & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part); id. at 185 (White, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); id. at 209 (Marshall, Douglas & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
15. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
16. Id. at 344 n.5.
17. The Supreme Court noted that "the sufficiency of the claim of entitlement must
be decided by reference to state law." Id. at 344. Justice Brennan, however, argued that
the ordinance would create an entitlement if "it was objectively reasonable for the
employee to believe he could rely on continued employment," even if the ordinance
were interpreted in later litigation not to confer tenure. Id. at 353-54 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
18. Unfortunately, the district judge gave no reason for his conclusion that the
employee "'held his position at the will and pleasure of the city.'" Id. at 345. The
interpretation of Bishop urged here-that the ordinance did not confer tenure because
it did not provide that employees could be dismissed if and only if their work was un-
satisfactory-is based on two passages in the Court's opinion. In the first of these, the
Court rejected the petitioner's argument
that even though the ordinance does not expressly so provide, it should be read to
prohibit discharge for any other reason, and therefore to confer tenure on all
permanent employees. ...
On its face the ordinance on which petitioner relies may fairly be read as con-
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not create an entitlement because it did not set out exclusive condi-
tions under which an employee could be dismissed.
B. The Supreme Court's Interpretation of "Property"
When the statutory entitlement theory appeared in Goldberg v.
Kelly, the Court did not explain whether it thought that a statutory
entitlement was a form of property, and implicated the due process
clause for that reason, or that a statutory entitlement itself implicated
the due process clause, whether or not it was also a form of property.' 9
Justice Brennan's majority opinion said merely: "Appellant [the Com-
missioner of Social Services of New York City] does not contend that
procedural due process is not applicable to the termination of welfare
benefits. Such benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for per-
sons qualified to receive them."'2 Justice Brennan then added in a
footnote that "[i]t may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements
as more like 'property' than a 'gratuity.' Much of the existing wealth
in this country takes the form of rights that do not fall within tradi-
tional common-law concepts of property."2' 1
In Board of Regents v. Roth,22 however, the Court held that a de-
privation only of liberty or property would implicate the due process
clause. Justice Stewart explained for the Court that "[t]he require-
ferring such a guarantee. However, such a reading 'is not the only possible interpreta-
tion; the ordinance may also be construed as granting no right to continued em-
ployment but merely conditioning an employee's removal on compliance with cer-
tain specified procedures.
Id. at 344-45 (footnote omitted).
In the second passage, the Court distinguished Arnett v. Kennedy on the grounds that
the statute in that case did provide that employees could be dismissed only for cause.
This [the conclusion that the ordinance in Bishop granted no right to continued
employment] is not the construction which six Members of this Court placed on
the federal regulations involved in Arnett v. Kennedy . . . . In that case the Court
concluded that because the employee could only be discharged for cause, lie had a
property interest which was entitled to constitutional protection. In this case, a
holding that as a matter of state law the employee "held his position at the will
and pleasure of the city" necessarily establishes that lie had no property interest.
Id. at 345 n.8 (emphasis in original). Bit see Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Prop-
erty": Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 445,
467-70 (1977).
19. Until Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), an interest might have been
protected by due process even if it were not one of "liberty" or "property." In Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), for example, Georgia was required to afford due process
before suspending the driver's license of an uninsured motorist inolved in an accident.
The Supreme Court did not conclude that the license was the "property" of the driver,
but that the driver had "important interests" in his license, which, for that reason,
could not be suspended without due process. Id. at 539.
20. 397 U.S. at 261-62.
21. Id. at 262 n.8.
22. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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ments of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of in-
terests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of
liberty and property. . . . [T]he range of interests protected by pro-
cedural due process is not infinite." 23 Justice Stewart then cited Gold-
berg for the proposition that a statutory entitlement to welfare bene-
fits was one such property interest and for that reason fell within the
ambit of the due process clause.
2 4
Although the Supreme Court has thus concluded that a statutory
entitlement is a form of property, it has not explained in much detail
why "property" should be so interpreted.2-° The opinions of the Jus-
tices, however, suggest two distinct explanations. The first of these is
that property includes things to which a person has a right and that a
23. Id. at 569-70. Despite this holding of Roth, the Court in that case and Justices in
cases since have continued to argue that the demise of the "right-privilege distinction"
subjdcts the revocation of governmental benefits to the requirements of procedural due
process. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 353 n.4 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 165 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part); id. at 210-11 (Marshall,
J., dissenting); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 9- n.9 (1972). The same
argument had been made before Roth in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970),
and Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
The right-privilege distinction had once enabled the government to grant or withhold
benefits on whatever terms it pleased, so long as the benefit were only a privilege and
not a right. That distinction was undercut by the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions,
which provides that governmental benefits, including mere privileges, may not be
granted or withdrawn on terms that burden the exercise of a constitutional right. Thus,
for example, the First Amendment requires that unemployment benefits not be with-
drawn for failure to accept work on Saturdays, when work on that day is forbidden by
the recipient's religion. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963). See generally Van
Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 H.XRV.
L. REV. 1439 (1968).
With the demise of the distinction, however, the Court argued that, because "relevant
constitutional restraints limit state power to terminate an entitlement whether the
entitlement is denominated a 'right' or a 'privilege,'" the due process clause would
govern such terminations. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. at 539. The Court's argument, how-
ever, does not show why the demise of the right-privilege distinction has made the due
process clause a constitutional restraint "relevant" to the termination of governmental
benefits. Other constitutional provisions may be violated by conditions attached to aly
such benefit, be it a right or a privilege. The due process clause, however, is implicated
only by a deprivation of "life, liberty, or property," as the Court reaffirmed in Roth.
The relevance of the due process clause thus depends, in these cases at least, on
whether the benefit to be revoked is the property of its recipient.
24. 408 U.S. at 577.
25. One might argue that the Supreme Court need not be concerned with the con-
cept of property underlying its decisions: if the due process clause is now to protect
statutory entitlements, then "property" will simply be deemed to include statutory
entitlements, and there the matter will end. But this approach is arbitrary. It does not
explain why the concept of property embraces statutory entitlements. Once any such
explanation is given, it may equally well justify the protection of interests other than
statutory entitlement. For example, the reliance concept of property-that property in-
cludes those things on which people rely-could include a recipient's interests under
statutes that do not create entitlements because they leave the question of who will
receive the benefit in the discretion of an official. See pp. 711-12 infa.
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statutory entitlement creates a right to a governmental benefit. The
second explanation is that property includes things on which people
rely and that people rely on governmental benefits to which they have
a statutory entitlement.2 6
II. Statutory Entitlement and the Concept of a Right
to a Governmental Benefit
The thesis that a statutory entitlement creates a right to a govern-
mental benefit is implicit in opinions of Justices Brennan, 27 Rehn-
quist,28 White,29 and Stevens.30 If it is true that a statutory entitlement
creates a right to a governmental benefit, then the concept of property
presupposed by the Supreme Court's recent cases would be an un-
remarkable extension of the traditional concept of property. In its
traditional sense, "property" denotes a certain class of legal rights,
namely, legal rights to the enjoyment of a thing.3 1 The due process
26. A third explanation, advocated by some lower courts, is that property includes
things that one expects. For a discussion of the similarities between the reliance and
expectation concepts of property, see note 69 infra.
27. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970), quoted at p. 698 supra.
28. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 152 (1974) (statute "conferred upon appellee the
right not to be removed save for cause").
29. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 360 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) ("The ordinance
plainly grants petitioner a right to his job unless there is cause to fire him."); Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 180, 185 (1974) (White,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
30. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345 (1976) (ordinance grants no right to continued
employment; full passage quoted at note 18 supra).
31. See B. ACKERMAN, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW 1 (1975); H. CAIRNS,
LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 58 (1935); 1 R. ELY, PROPERTY AND CONTRACT IN THEIR
RELATION TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH 101-02 (1914); Cohen, Dialogue on Private
Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REv. 357, 374 (1954); Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELl.
L.Q. 8, 11-12 (1927); Moore, The Emergence of New Property Conceptions in America,
I J. LEGAL & POLITICAL Soc., April, 1943, at 34-35; Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.
J. 733, 771 (1964).
The same concept of property appears to have been current when the Constitution
was adopted. Blackstone defined property to be "that sole and despotic dominion which
one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion
of the right of any other individual in the universe." 2 IV. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*2, quoted in J. CRIBBET, I r . FRITZ & C. JOHNSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY 1363
(3d ed. 1972).
The seventh edition of Dyche's dictionary, published in 1752, defined property as
"the right or title that a person has to any thing; and in Law, is esteemed the best
and highest title a person can have, and such as no ways depends upon the humour,
courtesy, or favour of another." T. DYCHE & W. PARDON, A N~w GENERAL ENGLISH
DICTIONARY, (7th ed. London 1752) (unpaginated). Dr. Johnson's dictionary provided the
following definitions:
3. Right of possession. Locke.
4. Possession held in one's own right. Dryden.
5. The thing possessed. Shakespeare.
6. Nearness or right. Shakespeare.
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clause has long protected rights against the government created by a
government contract. 3"- If it is now to protect rights created by statu-
tory entitlement as well, then the concept of property underlying the
statutory entitlement cases would require no more than a relabeling
of those rights as "property" rights.
Before inquiring whether a statutory entitlement creates a right to
a governmental benefit, however, it will be helpful to consider the
concept of a right. A right is an enforceable claim to the performance
of another person's duty.33 Professor H.L.A. Hart has described the
relations between a right and its correlative duty:
The idea is that of one individual being given by the law exclu-
sive control, more or less extensive, over another person's duty so
that in the area of conduct covered by that duty the individual
who has the right is a small-scale sovereign to whom the duty is
owed. The fullest measure of control [which may not be present
in all cases] comprises these three distinguishable elements: (i) the
right holder may waive or extinguish the duty or leave it in
existence; (ii) after breach or threatened breach of a duty he may
leave it 'unenforced' or may 'enforce' it by suing for compensa-
S. JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (3d ed. London 1768) (unpaginated).
A contemporary edition of Nathan Bailey's dictionary, the first edition of which purported
to be the first dictionary to define all of the words in the English language, said:
"Property [in Law] is the highest Right or Title that a Man has or call have to any
Thing, and no ways depending upon another Man's Courtesy .... ." N. BAILEY, AN
UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DiciIONARY (24th ed. E. Harwood London 1782) (un-
paginated). Although published in London, Dyche's, Johnson's, and Bailey's diction-
aries were, apparently, all available in America during the time when the Constitution
was adopted. Noah Webster referred to both the seventh edition of Dyche's dictionary
and Dr. Johnson's dictionary in preparing his own dictionary, first published in 1806.
S. STEGER, AMERICAN DICTIONARIES 31, 33 (1913). Thomas Jefferson had Bailey's and
Johnson's in his personal library, N. PooR, PRIsIcNT JEFFERSON'S LIBRARY 14 (Wash.,
D.C., 1829), and the Yale College Library had a copy of Johnson's dictionary in 1791,
when its catalogue was compiled. CATALOGUE OF BOOKS IN THE LIBRARY OF YALE-COLLEGE
6 (New Haven 1791).
The first dictionary published in America, S. JOHNSON, JR., A SCHOOL DICTIONARY (New
Haven 1798[t]), contains no definition of property. The second American dictionary,
published in 1800, defines property to be "possession" and possession to be "property,
the having in ones power." J. ELLIOTT & S. JOHNsON, JR., A SELECTEO, PRONOUNCING AND
ACCETED DICTIONARY 145, 141 (Suffield 1800). The first edition of Webster's dictionary,
published in 1806, defines property as "a right of possession." N. WErSTER, A CoM-
5'ENDIOUs DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 238 (Hartford 1806).
32. E.g., Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935) (repayment provision in govern-
ment bond); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934) (insurance policies issued by
government). But see note 35 injfra (discussing effect of doctrine of so ereign immunity
on rights held against government).
33. J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 12 (2d ed. 1921) ("The rights
correlative to those duties which the society will enforce ol the motion of an in-
dividual are that individual's legal rights."); Hart, Benth am on Legal Rights, in OxFoRD
ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 171 (Second Series, A. Simpson ed. 1973). The term "right" is
used in this Note to refer to a legal right.
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tion or, in certain cases, for an injunction or mandatory order to
restrain the continued or further breach of duty; and (iii) he may
waive or extinguish the obligation to pay compensation to which
the breach gives rise.
34
It follows from this concept of a right that, if a claim is to be a right,
that claim must not depend for its existence on the sufferance of the
party against whom it is to be asserted.3 5 If the claim can be extin-
guished by the party against whom it is to be asserted, then that party
is not under a duty at all; rather, he may simply withdraw his suf-
ferance of the claim. Since the party against whom the claim is
asserted has no duty, the holder of the claim has no right.
The existence of rights presupposes a legal system in which persons
can appear before an institution, assert their rights, and depend upon
an institution to enforce them. If there is no institution before which
to appear, then claims will not be enforceable, and rights will not
exist.36 In the United States, of course, rights are most often asserted
34. Hart, supra note 33, at 192 (footnote omitted).
35. Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity the government may not be sued
without its consent: a claim against the government is not enforceable, but exists only
on the continuing sufferance of the government. Tile effect of this anomalous doctrine
is to make it impossible to hold rights against the government, whether by statutory
entitlement or otherwise. For examples of the frustration of a constitutional claim by
failure of the government to consent, see United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941)
and United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940), as well as the discussion in Lynch v.
United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934). The existence of property rights against the govern-
ment is further imperiled by a variant of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the
doctrine that the goiernment need not pay judgments rendered against it. See Baltzer
v. North Carolina, 161 U.S. 240 (1896). But see 28 U.S.C. § 2414 (1970) (authorizing pay-
ment of such judgments).
The present argument, that a statutory entitlement does not create a right to a
governmental benefit, does not depend upon the power of the government to declare
its immunity. Whatever validity the argument may ha-e should suriive the demise of
the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
36. Professor Charles A. Reich seized on this fact in his seminal effort to find prop-
erty rights in governmental largesse, see Reich, supra note 31, at 778-79, and his argument
has recently been revived in Comment, Entitlement, Enjoyment, and Due Process of
Law, 1974 DUKE L.J. 89, 110. Reich argues that all property is really governmental
largesse. He points out that much property-land, for example-belonged originally to
the sovereign, who then granted title to private parties. Further, ei en personal property
stems from the government, in that it exists only by dint of law. Thus, Reich con-
cludes, rights in governmental benefits are no different from rights in traditional
property. Both stem from the state, and both are entitled to the protection of due
process.
The fallacy in Reich's argument is the conclusion that, because all property is
governmental largesse, all governmental largesse is therefore property. Reich reaches
this conclusion by conflating two different roles of government in a system of property.
Tile first of these roles is that of creator of the institution of property and, thus, of
enforcer of property rights created and held thereunder. As Reich and others have
noted, property is aus institution by which the government permits the creation of and
then enforces certain claims to the enjoyment of wealth. If the government did not
enforce those claims, property would not exist. The other role of government in a
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before the courts.37 Thus, to deny a person access to a court in which
to assert a right is, in general, to deprive him of the right itself.38
In order to see that a statutory entitlement does not create a right
to a governmental benefit,3 9 it will be useful to examine the entitle-
system of property is that of owner of property, a role that the government plays in
common with its citizens. The government may be the original owner of some property,
as Reich points out; it may acquire other property by donation, purchase, taxation, or
appropriation. The distinction between these two roles-enforcer of property rights and
owner of property-is illustrated by the fact that one can imagine a system of property
in which the government owned no property, but in which the government nevertheless
enforced the property rights of others.
When the two roles of government are distinguished, it becomes clear that the rela-
tion of the government to rights in private property is actually very different from the
relation of the government to rights in largesse. The existence of all property rights
is made possible by the government, as enforcer of those rights. But particular rights in
private property are actually created by private parties, whereas rights in largesse can
only be created by the government, as owner. Since the government need not create
such rights, one must inquire in each case whether the government actually has given
the recipient a right to the benefit and, thus, whether the government must afford due
process in revoking it.
37. Rights could also be asserted before an administrative body if that body were
independent of the party against whom the rights were asserted and if the body had
power to enforce the rights against that party.
38. This relation between rights and the jurisdiction of the courts in which they
may be asserted was raised in the Portal-to-Portal cases. In 1938 Congress passed the
Fair Labor Standards Act, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219
(1970 &' Supp. V 1975)), which required employers to pay certain minimum and over-
time wages. In Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946), the Supreme
Court construed the Act to require payment for time spent in activities that theretofore
had not been compensated at all, e.g., walking to and from the job site, obtaining
tools, and washing after work. Congress apparently had not intended to require pay-
ment for activities not previously compensated and passed the Portal-to-Portal Act, ch.
52, 61 Stat. 84 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-262 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)), in
response to the Court's ruling. The Portal-to-Portal Act provided, first, that no em-
ployer would be liable under the Fair Labor Standards Act for failure to pay minimum
wages or overtime compensation for activities that had not previously been compensable
by contract or custom in an industry and, second, that no court would have jurisdic-
tion of any action in which such wages were sought.
In Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 887
(1948), employees nevertheless sued for back wages, asserting that the Portal-to-Portal
Act deprived them of property without due process of law. The defendant employer
countered that the court had no jurisdiction, by virtue of the second provision of the
Act. In discussing the jurisdictional issue, Judge Chase argued that
while Congress has the undoubted power to give, withhold, and restrict the juris-
diction of courts other than the Supreme Court, it must not so exercise that power
as to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or
to take private property without just compensation.
Id. at 257. The jurisdictional provision of the Act would therefore stand or fall with the
constitutionality of the provision modifying the Fair Labor Standards Act, which the
court went on to uphold.
In a case dealing with government contracts, Justice Brandeis wrote that "[c]ontracts
between individuals or corporations are impaired within the meaning of the Constitu-
tion wheneier the right to enforce them by legal process is taken away or materially
lessened." Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 580 (1934).
39. The benefits discussed in this Note are benefits that have not yet been distributed.
The question of a recipient's rights in benefits that he has already received is al-
together different.
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ments created by four types of statutes, each of which concerns the
distribution of benefits by an official ("the Administrator"), and which
together cover the spectrum of statutes by which benefits are normally
distributed. These four types of statutes are: (1) statutes that authorize
the Administrator to distribute a benefit, leave the question of who
will receive the benefit within the Administrator's discretion, and
preclude judicial review of the Administrator's action; (2) statutes that
establish standards of eligibility, require the Administrator to dis-
tribute the benefit according to those standards, and preclude judicial
review of the Administrator's action; (3) statutes that establish stan-
dards of eligibility, require the Administrator to distribute the benefit
according to those standards, and permit judicial review of the Ad-
ministrator's action; and (4) statutes that direct the Administrator to
enter into contracts with recipients, guaranteeing distribution of the
benefit under certain conditions and for a stated time.
The National Housing Act is an example of the first type of statute.
It authorizes the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to
make expenditures for the structural repair of certain privately owned
homes. 40 The Secretary decides which homeowners, if any, will receive
such payments, and her decisions are "final and conclusive and shall
not be subject to judicial review."' Statutes authorizing an official to
hire and fire employees at his pleasure are also of this sort.42 This type
of statute does not seem to fall within the statutory entitlement theory
at all. As developed by the Supreme Court, the theory appears to re-
quire that the statute itself define the class of persons who are to
receive the benefit;4 3 indeed, it is hard to see how one can be entitled
to a benefit under a statute that leaves the Administrator free to
distribute the benefit to whomever he sees fit, or not to distribute it
at all.
The second type of statute establishes standards of eligibility, re-
quires the Administrator to distribute the benefit according to those
standards, and precludes judicial review of the Administrator's action.
44
40. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1735b(b) (West Dec. 1976 Pamphlet).
41. 12 U.S.C. § 1735b(c) (1970).
42. In Sims v. Fox, 505 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975), for
example, the court considered a statute that provided that reserve officers serve "'at the
pleasure of the President'" and concluded that no entitlement was created thereby. Id.
at 861 (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 1162 (1970)). An interesting discussion of statutes governing
the tenure of federal employees may be found in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 181-82
(1974) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
43. See pp. 696-98 supra; Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 165-67 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring in part); id. at 180-86 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
44. It is assumed here that the statute also precludes reiiew by an administrative
body independent of the Administrator and with the power to enforce its olders against
him. See note 37 supra.
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Perhaps the largest program administered under such a statute is the
veterans' benefits program. The statute governing that program creates
an "entitlement" to veterans' benefits, 45 establishes detailed standards
of eligibility,40 directs the Administrator to ensure the proper execu-
tion and administration of these provisions, 47 and then provides that
the decisions of the Administrator on any question of law or
fact under any law administered by the Veterans' Administration
providing benefits for veterans and their dependents or survivors
shall be final and conclusive and no other official or any court
of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review
any such decision by an action in the nature of mandamus or
otherwise.48
Similar statutes govern compensation for property lost in military
service 40 and for work injuries sustained by government employees. 0
The constitutionality of such statutes is long established.5I
As the Supreme Court's cases on statutory entitlement now stand,
one cannot be sure whether statutes of this type create entitlements
or not. In all five of the Court's cases in which a statutory entitlement
existed, some type of judicial review was provided.52 But the Supreme
Court made mention of judicial review in only three of the five cases.
And even in those three cases, there is no sign that the Court thought
that judicial review was necessary to the existence of the entitlement.
But if statutes of this type do create entitlements, thereby making
the benefits distributed under them the property of their recipients,
45. 38 U.S.C. §§ 310, 321, 331, 341 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
46. Id. §§ 310-361.
47. Id. § 210 (1970).
48. Id. § 211.
49. 31 U.S.C. §§ 240-243 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
50. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8150 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Judicial review is precluded by id.
§ 8128(b) (1970).
51. E.g., United States v. Babcock, 250 U.S. 328 (1919) (upholding provisions for
compensation for property lost in military service); De Rodulfa v. United States, 461
F.2d 1240, 1257-58 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949 (1972) (upholding veterans'
benefits program; citing similar cases); Blanc v. United States, 244 F.2d 708 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 874 (1957) (upholding federal employees' compensation plan);
Hancock v. Mitchell, 231 F.2d 652 (3d Cir. 1956) (semble).
52. In three cases, the Court's opinion mentioned that judicial review was available.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 n.10
(1975); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260 (1970). Judicial review of the termination of
old age benefits in California, which the Court considered in Wheeler v. Montgomery,
397 U.S. 280 (1970), is provided by CAL. WI.F. & INsT. CooE § 10962 (West 1972). In
the remaining case, Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (discharge from federal civil
service), judicial review was available, but its scope was limited to the questions of
whether the statutory procedures were followed and whether the action was arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Harvey v. Nunlist, 499 F.2d 335 (5th Cir. 1974);
Frommhagen v. Klein, 456 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1972); Paulcy v. United States, 419 F.2d
1061 (7th Cir. 1969).
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"property" cannot be interpreted to be a right to the enjoyment of a
thing. Statutes of this type do not create rights. Since aggrieved ap-
plicants may not seek judicial review of the Administrator's action,
they have no legally enforceable claim at all and, therefore, no right
to the benefit. Thus if the statutory entitlement theory is to apply to
statutes of this type, the theory must presuppose some concept of prop-
erty other than the concept of a right.
The third type of statute establishes standards of eligibility, requires
the Administrator to distribute the benefit according to those stan-
dards, and permits judicial review of the Administrator's action. 53
Each of the cases in which the Supreme Court found a statutory en-
titlement concerned a statute of this type.54 As applied to this third
type of statute, the statutory entitlement theory again presupposes
some concept of property other than the concept of a right to the
enjoyment of a thing. It is quite true that the provision of judicial
review gives the recipient a right, which he does not have under
statutes of the second type. But that right is a right only to the
performance of the Administrator's duties under the statute, not a
right to the benefit itself.
To see that judicial review of the Administrator's action gives the
recipient a right only to the performance of the Administrator's duties
under the statute, one must distinguish between rights enforceable
against the Administrator only, like those created by statutes of the
third type, and rights also enforceable despite the opposition of the
legislature. These latter rights are those that can be enforced by hold-
ing statutes void or by ordering a government official to act in the
absence, or in violation, of a statutory duty. A right enforceable
against the Administrator can be created by statute: a statute will
bind the Administrator and create enforceable claims against him,
without depending in any way on his approval or sufferance. A right
also enforceable despite the opposition of the legislature, however,
cannot be created by statute alone. Since the legislature remains free
to repeal the statute,5 any right created thereby must depend upon
53. If a federal statute does not preclude judicial review, it may be provided by § 10
of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(a), 702 (1970).
54. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 336-39 (1976); Coss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,
567, 573, 581 n.10 (1975); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 140 (1974) (judicial review
limited to questions of whether statutory procedures were followed and whether action
was arbitrary, capricious, or abuse of discretion (see note 52 supra)); Wheeler v. Mont-
gomery, 397 U.S. 280, 281 (1970); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260 (1970).
55. In discussing the statutory entitlement theory, the Supreme Court has never
suggested that entitlements, and thus property interests, can be created only by statutes
that are unrepealable. Nor, conversely, has the Court ever suggested that a statute be-
comes unrepealable if it does create an entitlement.
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the continuing sufferance of the legislature and, thus, could not be
enforced despite its opposition.
It might be objected that, until a statute actually is repealed, it
does create a right enforceable despite the opposition of the legis-
lature. But this objection misconceives the nature of a right. A right
cannot depend for its existence on the sufferance of the party despite
whose opposition it is to be invoked.56 Whatever rights exist by statute
depend upon the continuing sufferance of the legislature. Such rights
can be enforced against the Administrator, or against anyone else
whom the legislature has the power to bind by statute, but not despite
the opposition of the legislature itself.
A right held only against the Administrator, however, could not be
a right to the benefit itself because the Administrator has no power to
distribute the benefit in the face of a decision by the legislature to
terminate the benefit program. The legislature may always retake those
funds from the Administrator, so long as they remain unspentY Thus
the recipient has a right only to the performance of the Adminis-
trator's duties under the statute5s
So long as the statute authorizing a benefit is not repealed, it makes
little difference to an eligible recipient whether his right is one to the
benefit itself or only to the performance of the Administrator's duties,
since he will receive his benefit either way. From the legislature's point
of view, however, the nature of the recipient's right makes a great deal
of difference. If the legislature wants to ensure that the benefit will
56. See p. 702 supra.
57. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7; 31 U.S.C. §§ 492(a), 725-725b (1970).
58. It may be objected that, even if an eligible recipient's right is only to the
performance of the Administrator's duties under the statute and not to the benefit itself,
that right is the right recently protected by the Supreme Court under the due process
clause. In fact, the protection afforded a right to the performance of the Administrator's
duties would be quite different from the protection prescribed by the Supreme Court
in its recent cases on statutory entitlement.
If an eligible recipient had a right to the benefit itself, then he would be deprived
of his right if the Administrator declared him ineligible and revoked the benefit. The
due process clause would protect such a right by requiring the Administrator to follow
constitutionally acceptable procedures in determining eligibility, as the Supreme Court
held in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266-71 (1970), and its progeny. If the recipient's
right were only to the performance of the Administrator's duties under the statute,
however, then he would have no right at stake so long as the Administrator followed
the statutory procedures. A recipient would be deprived of that right if, for example,
the Administrator refused to perform his duties, or if the courts refused to hear the
recipient's claim against the Administrator, or if some other official denied the
recipient access to the courts. Even if the due process clause protected the recipients
against these deprivations, the protection afforded would have nothing to do with the
constitutionality of the statutory procedures by which the Administrator is to determine
eligibility and would, therefore, differ greatly from that prescribed by the Supreme
Court in its recent cases. See Van Alstyne, supra note 18, at 459-60.
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be distributed for a certain time, thus binding itself and perhaps some
of its successors, it will make an irrevocable grant of funds to the
Administrator and give the recipients a right to their benefits.5t On
the other hand, if the legislature does not want so to bind itself, then
it might pass a statute of the third type, allowing the recipients to
sue for the performance of the Administrator's duties, but giving ,them
no right to the continuation of their benefit."
The fourth type of statute directs the Administrator to enter into
contracts with the recipients, guaranteeing distribution of the benefit
under certain conditions and for a stated time."1 The National Hous-
ing Act, for instance, authorizes the United States Housing Authority
to make contributions to low-rent housing projects and directs the
Authority to enter into contracts for such payments. The Act provides:
The Authority may make annual contributions to public hous-
ing agencies to assist in achieving and maintaining the low-rent
character of their housing projects. The annual contributions for
any such project shall be fixed in uniform amounts, and shall be
paid in such amounts over a fixed period of years. The Authority
shall embody the provisions for such annual contributions in a
contract guaranteeing their payment over such fixed period .... 112
The Merchant Marine Act similarly directs the Secretary of Com-
merce to enter into contracts for the payment of various shipping
59. This could be done, for example, by making an irrevocable grant of fluds to an
independent corporation, which would in turn be obliged to distribute the benefit.
The corporation would then have the right to retain til benefit fund from the
legislature, and the rights of the recipients against the corporation would be rights
to the benefit itself. Such a corporation would be similar to the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting (CPB). The CPB was created by Congress but is "not . .. an agency or
establishment of the United States Government." 47 U.S.C. § 396(b) (1970). Grants to the
CPB are not irrevocable, howeer, because Congress has expressly reserved "[tihe right
to repeal, alter, or amend" the statute creating the CPB. Id. § 396(j). Moreover, al-
though the CPB is authorized to make payments to certain broadcasters, id. § 396
(g)(2)(C), it is not required to do so. Thus those broadcasters have no statutory entitle-
ment to payments from the CPB.
60. One might argue that, while property rights are irrevocable without due process,
the requirements of due process would be fulfilled by a duly enacted statute revoking
the benefit. But if one's interest in a benefit could be extinguished by such legislation,
then that interest could not be a right because it would depend for its existence on the
party despite whose opposition it is to be invoked. See p. 702 supra. Coniersely, if one's
interest were a right, it could not be extinguished by legislation alone (unless, perhaps,
just compensation were provided as well).
61. Statutes of the fourth type may either leave it in the Administrator's discretion
to decide with whom he will contract or establish standards of eligibility and require
the Administrator to contract according to those standards. In the latter case, tile statute
would create an entitlement to the benefit. See pp. 696-98 supra. The present argu-
ment, that it is not the statute but the contracts signed pursuant to the statute that
create rights to the benefit, applies to statutes of either sort.
62. 42,U.S.C. § 1410(a) (1970).
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subsidies. There is no doubt that statutes of this type lead to the
creation of rights1 and, indeed, that such rights are protected by due
process.35 These rights are created not by the statute, however, but by
the contracts signed pursuant to it.
If one equates a statutory entitlement with a right, then one is led
to the conclusion that the legislature cannot extend benefits to a
certain class of persons while retaining the option to terminate those
benefits. By passing a statute of the first type, the legislature would
leave it in the Administrator's discretion to distribute the benefit as
he sees fit. By passing a statute of the second or third types, however,
the legislature would create entitlements to the continuation of the
benefit. If statutory entitlements and rights are equated, one is led to
the conclusion that statutes that create entitlements to the continuation
of a benefit also create rights to the continuation of the benefit, thereby
making the benefit irrevocable. But this conclusion is plainly false:
legislatures remain free to revoke benefits to which recipients have a
statutory entitlement, and the Supreme Court has not suggested other-
wise.006 In order to avoid this conclusion, the statutory entitlement
theory must presuppose some concept of property other than the con-
cept of a right to a governmental benefit.
III. The Reliance Concept of Property
The second explanation of the concept of property underlying the
statutory entitlement theory-that property includes that on which
people rely and that people rely on benefits to which they have a
statutory entitlement-was suggested by Justice Stewart. In explaining
the statutory entitlement theory, he wrote that "[i]t is a purpose of the
ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which
people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily
undermined." 7 The reliance theory has since been taken up by Justice
63. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1152(a), 1173(a), 1198, 1403 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
64. But see note 35 supra (discussing effect of doctrine of sovereign immunity on
rights held against government).
65. See note 32 supra (citing cases).
66. See p. 706 & note 55 supra. This argument assumes that judicial review is not
necessary to the existence of a statutory entitlement. If review is necessary, so that
entitlements may be created only by statutes of the third type, then the equation of
entitlements and rights leads to the conclusion that the legislature cannot extend both
benefits and judicial review to a certain class of persons while itself retaining the
option to terminate the benefit. But this conclusion is likewise false.
67. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
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Brennan,'; the Ninth Circuit,"a and various comlentators.7 0
This reliance concept of property ("those claims upon which people
rely in their daily lives") is certainly wide enough to encompass statu-
tory entitlements (assuming, of course, that people do rely on benefits
to which they have a statutory entitlement). But the reliance concept
of property is nevertheless open to at least three objections: it rests on
a misinterpretation of the purpose of the institution of property; it is
inconsistent with the approach taken by the Supreme Court in
virtually all of its cases on statutory entitlement; and it would require
a radical expansion of the ambit of the due process clause.
Justice Stewart's statement of the reliance concept misinterprets the
purpose of the institution of property because it ignores the crucial
role of rights in the relation between property and reliance. Various
commentators, including Bentham,7' Hart,7"  and Reich 73  have
pointed out that the function of the institution of property is to
enable persons to hold rights to the enjoyment of wealth and to
enforce those rights at the instance of their holders.74 Having acquired
such a right, a person may come to rely on, the wealth to which he is
thereby entitled. But it is his right, not his reliance, that the institu-
tion of property will protect: his right would be nonetheless enforce-
able though he had not relied on it; equally, reliance itself would
not gain him an enforceable claim to wealth to which he had no
right.75 Thus, if the institution of property protects claims upon
which people rely, as the reliance concept of property supposes, it
68. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 353-54 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
69. Pence v. Kleppe, 529 F.2d 135, 141 (9th Cir. 1976). Some courts haxe interpreted
the due process clause to protect expectation of, rather than reliance on, goernmental
benefits. Soni v. Board of Trustees, 513 F.2d 347, 350-51 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 919 (1976); Geneva Towers Tenants Organization v. Federated Mortgage Investors,
504 F.2d 483, 489 (9th Cir. 1974); Zimmerer v. Spencer, 485 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir. 1973).
The expectation and reliance concepts of property yield vcry similar results, since one
often expects and relies on the same thing. If anything, the expectation concept is
the wider of the two, since there are probably more benefits that one expects but does
not rely on, than there are benefits that one relies on but does not expect.
70. The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 H.%RV. L. REv. 1, 96, 98-99, 104 (1976); Note,
Procedural Due Process in Government-Subsidized Housing, 86 HARV. L. RLV. 880, 890
(1973); see Comment, supra note 36, at 89, 115.
71. J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF. LEGISLATION, PRINCIPLES OF i CIVIL CODE 111-13 (E.
Dumont ed. 1864), quoted in J. CRIBBEr, V. FRITZ & C. JOHNSON, su pra note 31, at 1358-59.
72. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEvr OF LvW 27-28 (1961).
73. Reich, supra note 31, at 771.
74. See pp. 700-02 supra.
75. In the law of contracts, action taken in reliance on a promise will sometimes make
the promise enforceable, thereby giving the promisee a right to the fulfillment of the
promise. Section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts, for example, proiides: "A promise
which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a
definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce
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does so only in the course of protecting claims to which people have
a right.
A second objection to the reliance concept of property is that it is
inconsistent with the approach taken by the Supreme Court in
virtually all of its cases on statutory entitlement. Under the reliance
concept, a statutory entitlement would not itself create a property
interest, but would do so only when recipients relied on the benefits
to which they were entitled. Thus in the five cases in which the
Supreme Court found a statutory entitlement, the existence of an
entitlement would not have settled the issue, as it did.7 r Rather, an
entitlement would have been relevant only as evidence of reliance,
though it might have been deemed conclusive evidence. Conversely,
in Bishop v. Wood, 7 where the statute did not create an entitlement,
the Court would have gone on to consider other evidence of reliance.
Finally, in Board of Regents v. Roth78 and Perry v. Sindermann,79
where no statute was relevant, the Court looked only to the employee's
contractual rights, whether express or implied. If the Court had em-
braced a reliance concept of property, it would have investigated the
employee's reliance on his claim to a job, irrespective of whether that
reliance was supported by a contract.
A third objection to the reliance concept is that it would require a
radical expansion of the ambit of the due process clause. Many new
claims would be protected, since reliance may be engendered by much
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of
the promise." RL"-TATiLMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
It might be argued by analogy with § 90 that just as reliance on a promise will
create a right to its enforcement, reliance on an entitlement transforms the underlying
statute into a contract within the meaning of the contract clause of the Constitution,
thereby making the statute unrepealable and creating a right to the benefit. Apparently,
however, the Supreme Court has not held since Wood v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362 (1941), that
a statute had become a contract binding on a legislature.
The argument that reliance on a statutory entitlement to a benefit will create a right
to that benefit under the contract clause would save the reliance concept from the
objection urged here-that it ignores the fact that the institution of property does not
protect reliance unless coupled with a right. But the reliance concept would then be
open to the new objection that it encompasses only those benefits conferred by statutes
that had become unrepealable under the contract clause because they had been relied
upon by recipients. The Supreme Court, however, has never suggested either that a
statute must first be transformed into a contract in order to create an entitlement pro-
tected by due process or that any of the entitlements it has thus far protected were
created by a statute that had actually been so transformed. The reliance concept of
property would then be too narrow to support the statutory entitlement theory.
76. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975);
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
77. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
78. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
79. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
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more than statutory entitlements. For example, statutes of the first
type discussed in Part I, which leave it in the Administrator's discre-
tion to distribute benefits as he sees fit,s0 may nevertheless engender
reliance on the benefit thus distributed. Several lower courts have
already extended the due process clause to protect the interests of
recipients under such statutes."' And reliance might be engendered
simply by regularity of policy, without reference to statute. If the
Army has traditionally sold off a certain amount of surplus equipment
each year and merchants have built businesses in reliance on this tradi-
tion, the Army would then have to afford due process before reducing
its sales. As Justice Stewart suggested in Roth, reliance per se would
be protected, whether or not that reliance sprang from an entitlement.
Furthermore, the due process clause governs the deprivation of any
property, whether its origins are in the public sector or the private.
8 2
80. See p. 704 supra.
81. In Geneva Towers Tenants Organization v. Federated Mortgage Investors, 504
F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1974), tenants of a federally subsidized housing development asserted
that the due process clause required notice and a hearing before the Secretary of Housing
and Urban Development could allow the landlord to raise rents. The development was
subsidized under a statute that enables the Secretary to provide interest subsidies to
certain developers, whose rents and other charges are in turn to be regulated by the
Secretary. The court concluded that the tenants had a property interest sufficient to
implicate the due process clause: "[I]t lies in their expectation, statutorily created, that
they will continue to receive the benefits of low cost housing." Id. at 489 (emphasis in
original).
Judge Hufstedler dissented. The majority erred, she argued, in finding an entitle-
ment merely in expectations created by the beneficial purpose of the statute. Even
if the statute had required the Secretary to subsidize housing, it would still not have
created an entitlement. Rather, an entitlement is created when Congress extends to
beneficiaries "some kind of enforceable interest or, to put it slightly differently, . . . a
governmental obligation." Id. at 494. A benefit in which one has such an enforceable
interest, she argued, is one that must be granted when stated conditions are fulfilled. If
the existence of those conditions is contested, then the due process clause will require
an evidentiary hearing to resolve the conflict. On the other hand, if no legal con-
sequences follow necessarily from the proof of a certain fact, then a hearing on a con-
flict over the fact would be pointless, and the due process clause would not require it.
Id. at 494-96. See Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243, 1247-48 (1st Cir. 1970) (holding in
analogous circumstances that tenants have no right to due process because they "are not
legally 'entitled' to low rents in the same sense that the welfare recipient in Goldberg
v. Kelly . . . was entitled to basic sustenance under a system of categorical assistance"
and that no hearing would be required unless "the outcome turns on accurate resolu-
tion of specific factual disputes").
In Pence v. Kleppe, 529 F.2d 135 (9th Cir. 1976), the court considered a statute that
empowered the Secretary of the Interior "in his discretion and under such rules as lie
may prescribe" to allot to native Alaskans parcels of land that they had used for at
least five years. Judge Duniway concluded for the court that the native Alaskans relied
on their use of the land and, therefore, that the due process clause would govern the
Secretary's decision. Id. at 141. A similar case is Caramico v. Secretary of the Dep't of
Hous. & Urban Dev., 509 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1974), discussed at note 83 infra.
82. E.g., North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Clhem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (bank
accounts); Fuentes v. Slevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (household furnishings); Sniadach v.
Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (wages). See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 185
(1974) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
712
Statutory Entitlement and the Concept of Property
Thus under the reliance concept, the due process clause would protect
reliance engendered by private citizens as well as that engendered by
the government. Assume, for example, that one person has tradition-
ally supported a second, so that the second person has come to rely on
the first for subsistence. If the government then proposes to imprison
the first, or to revoke his professional license, or to terminate his
welfare payments, thereby undermining the reliance that the second
person has placed in the first, the government would have to afford
due process to the second person, 3 as well as to the first, before doing
50.84
One might limit the concept of property to government engendered
reliance by arguing that any privately created reliance important
enough to be protected by the due process clause would already be
secured either by an express agreement of the parties or by a quasi-
contract to which the reliance gave rise. In either case, the reliance
would be tied to a right, express or implied, and would be protected
by the due process clause for that reason. In the public sphere, how-
ever, there are many important benefits on which people rely, like
welfare and unemployment benefits, that are nevertheless not secured
by an express agreement with the government or by quasi-contract.
Thus, the argument continues, in order to protect all important re-
liance, the due process clause need protect reliance per se only when
it is engendered by the government.
This is really an argument for limiting the protection of the due
process clause to important reliance. If important reliance not other-
83. There may be some cases in which it would be redundant to afford due process
to the second person because all facts relevant to the decision could be adduced through
the duc process afforded the first person. Such cases are most likely to occur when the
action to be taken against the first person is governed by rigid standards, from which
one call ascertain which facts are relevant and which are not. But even when such
standards exist, there may be some cases in which the second person could shed ad-
ditional light on the relevant facts, and the due process clause would then require that
the second person be heard before the go~ernment undermined his reliance on the first.
Caramico v. Secretary of the Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 509 F.2d 694, 699-702
(2d Cir. 1974), is just such a case. Carandco concerned the mortgage insurance regulations
of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). Those regulations prosided that, when
a landlord defaulted on an FHA-insured mortgage, the mortgagee could recover the
unpaid balance of his loan only after he tendered possession of the property, tinoccupied,
to the FHA. Tenants whose landlords had defaulted asserted that the due process clause
se(1uired the FHA to afford due process when deciding whether to waie its requirement
that buildings be unoccupied when possession is tendered. The Second Circuit agreed.
Judge Feinberg wrote for the court that a hearing would enable tenants to bring to tile
attention of the FHA information relesant to its decision, vet unknown to tle mort-
gagees. *Only plaintiffs . . . liae both the motihe and information to insure that a
reasoned decision, taking their interest into account, will be made." Id. at 701.
81. There are some urgent cases, of course, in which the government may temporarily
deprive a person of property before affording due process. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416
U.S. 134, 178-79 (1974) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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wise protected happens to occur only in the public sphere, then the
due process clause will happen to protect reliance per se only when it
is publicly created. But if there is ever important reliance in the
private sphere that is not protected by contract or quasi-contract, then
this argument gives no reason why that reliance should not also be
protected.
Conclusion
In Goldberg v. Kelly the Supreme Court brought statutory entitle-
ments within the protection of the due process clause. Many saw this
as a prelude to the protection of all "important interests"'' of the
individual in the modern state.s In Board of Regents v. Roth, how-
ever, the Court held that the due process clause would protect only
liberty or property; yet the Court upheld Goldberg by concluding
that statutory entitlement is a form of property. But neither of the
Court's explanations for this conclusion is satisfactory:87 the rights
concept of property is too narrow to encompass statutory entitlement,
while the reliance concept is so broad that it requires the very ex-
pansion of due process eschewed by the Court in Roth.
85. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
86. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARV. L. RLv. 1, 103 (1970). See alho
Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. Rav. 405, 406-10 (1977); Tushnet,
The Newer Property: Suggestion for the Revival of Substantive Due Process, 1975 Sul'.
CT. REv. 261, 261-62.
87. Another explanation, the expectation concept of property, is discussed at note 69
supra.
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